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I. THE ISSUE AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE
The Spring 2005 issue of the Yale Law Journal published a
lengthy review by New York University Law School Profesor Frank
K. Upham1 of my book, Sending Law to the Countryside. Professor
Upham’s central criticisms are two: first, my “uncritical acceptance of
a linear version of modernization theory,”2 a criticism that I will not
address in this essay; and second, my “greatest flaw,” “the absence of
politics and political power.” My work, he says, “is reticent to the
point of timidity when it comes to politics,” “[a]side from the small-p
3
politics,” by which he appears to mean the internal conflicts and
interpersonal quarrels of the workplace. I emphasize these words to
show that Professor Upham intends to make his point absolutely clear
and forestall any possible misunderstanding of the word by readers.
Moreover, his choice of the word “timidity” implicates the author’s
academic honesty in the political dominance of the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP).
Contrary to Professor Upham’s characterization, my book
actually repeatedly reveals the influence on the judiciary of politics,
* Professor of Law, Dean of Peking University Law School. L.L.B. (Peking University,
1982); L.L.M. (McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific, 1987); M.A. (Arizona State
University, 1989); and Ph.D. (Arizona State University, 1992). The Chinese version of this
paper was presented at the “Constitutionalism and the Judicial Power in China” conference,
organized by the Sciences Po and the Centre d’Études et de Recherches Internationales (CERI)
and held on December 12-13, 2005, Paris, France. I am grateful for the valuable comments and
suggestion of participants of the conference.
1. Frank K. Upham, Who Will Find the Defendant if He Stays with His Sheep? Justice in
Rural China, 114 YALE L. J. 1675 (2005) (reviewing ZHU SULI, SENDING LAW TO THE
COUNTRYSIDE: RESEARCH ON CHINA’S BASIC LEVEL JUDICIAL SYSTEM (2000)).
2. Id. at 1700.
3. Id. at 1698, 1703 (emphasis added).
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especially the CCP’s policies, including local Party organizations’
multifarious interference in cases. This coverage is most evident in
Part I of the book, which analyzes the influence of politics over
judiciary from macro, middle, and micro levels. Chapter I projects
the sending of the law to the countryside as an extension of the power
of the nation-state to the basic level of society and points out that the
judicial system in contemporary China assumes a political role.
Chapter II discusses how the political control over judicial affairs is
possible through the judicial administration within the courts and the
judicial system. Chapter III focuses on the adjudication committee
(shenpan weiyuanhui), a judicial organization within each court
designed to deal—at least according to statutory law—with hard and
important cases, and analyzes the multiple function of this micro
institution within courts. Other chapters also have abundant analysis
of politics and political power.4 Thus, while I may not meet Prof.
Upham’s expectations about how much discussion there should be of
politics and political power, his judgment that there is none at all is
without foundation.
Certainly, such analyses may not be enough and should be
extended by other research. However, I want to emphasize that I
wrote the book in Chinese for a Chinese audience and never intended
it to satisfy the political and ideological tastes of any foreign readers;
Professor Upham’s frustration or dissatisfaction is therefore
understandable.
Nevertheless, Professor Upham’s review attracted my attention
and needs to be countered, not because he has any new insights or
makes any contribution to the study of law in China, but rather
because his errors in methodology are typical of some Western
observers of China and are influential in China. Such errors reveal
not only the deep ideological bias that is central to the “moral
authority” of the Western notion of the autonomy of law and “rule of
law” (a shaky authority that has evaporated after 9/11), but also a
theoretical mistake that is common in comparative or implicitly
comparative studies of China. In other words, it is the impact of these
and similar errors on recent legal studies in China over the recent
decades that has prompted me to write this response. Moreover,
precisely because Upham’s errors are characteristic of the
shortcomings in analyses of Chinese law, this essay is not simply a

4. ZHU SULI, SENDING LAW TO THE COUNTRYSIDE: RESEARCH ON CHINA’S BASIC
LEVEL JUDICIAL SYSTEM chs. 7, 10, 14 (2000)).
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response to Upham’s book review, but also a paper of its own
independent significance.
II. IS A DISTINCTION NECESSARY?
Professor Upham’s criticism of my work as failing to address
politics and political power is internally illogical and contradictory
because his review also acknowledges, at least implicitly, that I did
analyze the influence of various social actors, including the Party and
government, upon the operation of basic courts. So, what then is
Professor Upham’s complaint? A careful reading suggests that what
troubles Professor Upham is my failure to devote a chapter or
chapters to a relatively systematic analysis of the CCP’s interference
in the operation of basic level courts. As I already noted, this charge
is untrue. However, even if the criticism were valid, we need to note
that it is based on three implicit presuppositions: first, that there is a
unique political influence that comes purely from the CCP; second,
that it is possible to create a standard model of a judiciary free from
political influence or meddling; and third, that it is possible and
necessary for researchers to examine and measure independently
such influence. All three presuppositions are unrealistic.
In my own view, and in the view (explicit and implicit) of many
Chinese and foreign scholars, the CCP’s influence and control is
ubiquitous; it penetrates every aspect of society. Despite the many
political differences between the CCP and its former arch-rival, the
Nationalist Party (known as the Guomindang or GMD) and despite
the fact that the CCP never used the GMD’s often deployed concept
of the “party-state,” in practice, the CCP inherited the political
tradition, initiated by Sun Yat-sen5 and pursued by the GMD,
comprised of a “party construction of the state,” “party rule of the
state,” and “party above the state.” Indeed, eventually, the CCP’s
influence over society and the machinery of the state would far
exceed that achieved by the GMD.
The evidence is abundant. First, during the GMD’s rule of
mainland China (1927-1949), political control of entire regions
remained in the hands of provincial strongmen or warlords, and the

5. Sun Yat-sen was the first President of the Republic of China, and founder and leader of
the GMD. SUN ZHONGSHAN, SUN ZHONGSHAN QUANJI [COMPLETE WORKS OF SUN YATSEN], vol. 8, at 267-68, vol. 9, at 103-04 (1986).
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GMD’s unification of China was more symbolic than real.6 Second,
the same was true of political parties. Whether or not the GMD
wanted to recognize it at the time, even during the GMD’s rule, the
CCP occupied a considerable amount of territory, enjoyed the
support of a large number of the people, and controlled independent
armed military forces. There were, as well, some other smaller
political parties. Third, in the Nationalist government, even within
the GMD itself, there was a group of relatively independent and
socially influential scholars and technocrats. Fourth, because of the
GMD’s weakness, to a certain extent the traditional model of social
control being exercised by a combination of imperial (central) and
gentry (local elite) power persisted, with the central government
having rather weak influence in rural China.7 In conclusion, the
GMD built only a superstructure and did not, because it could not,
8
implement its will and policies down to the lowest levels of society.
Indeed, this inability to achieve its goal of social transformation is
what led to the GMD’s loss of the mainland in 1949.
In the judiciary, too, the GMD fruitlessly sought to establish total
control. From its earliest years, even before it had established
national political control, the GMD insisted on “partyization of the
judiciary” (sifa danghua). Subsequently, it continued to adopt
9
systematic measures in this regard, and there is evidence to show
that in some cases, the GMD exercised strong direct control.10
6. 2 DENG XIAOPING XUANJI [SELECTED READINGS OF DENG XIAOPING] 299 (2d ed.
1994).
7. FEI XIAOTONG, HUANGQUAN HE SHENQUAN [IMPERIAL POWER AND GENTRY
POWER] (1988).
8. Some historical researchers testify that conflicts between GMD local branches and
local governments always ended with the victory of local governments during the GMD’s rule.
Cf. Wang Xianzhi, Kangzhan shiqi guomindang zuzhi jianshe yu zuzhi fazhan de jige wenti
[Issues on GMD’s Organizational Construction and Development During the Anti-Japanese
War], 1990 JINDAISHI YANJIU, no. 2, at 230-50 (1990); Zhongshen & Tang Sengshu, Shilun
Nanjing guomin zhengfu xunzheng qianqi (1928-1937) de difang dangzheng jiufeng [The Local
Party-Government Conflicts in Early Tutelary Period (1928-1937) of Nanjing National
Government], 1999 SHIXUE YUEKAN, no. 2, at 53-58(1999).
9. The earliest recorded statement available referring to partyization was made by Xuqian
in 1926; Ju Zheng, a founding member of GMD and later Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of
National Government, elaborated it in 1934. According to Ju Zheng, partyization has three
criteria: all judicial personnel must be GMD’s members; GMD policies must be applied in
adjudications; and all the judges must accept the Three People’s Principles (the political
ideology of GMD). Ju Zheng, Sifa danghua wenti [On Partyization of the Judiciary], 1934
DONGFANG ZAZHI, no. 10 (1934).
10. Cf. WO SUO ZHIDAO DE HANJIAN ZHOU FUHAI [TRAITOR ZHOU FUHAI, AS I KNOW]
(Wen Fei ed., 2005); WO SUO ZHIDAO DE HANJIAN CHEN GONGBO [TRAITOR CHEN GONGBO,
AS I KNOW] (Wen Fei ed., 2005).
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However, this insistence on partyization demonstrated that the
GMD’s control and influence over the judiciary was not complete.
Because of this reality, it would be possible, though still very difficult,
to distinguish GMD influence from other political or governmental
influence.
In the years immediately following the CCP’s assumption of
power in 1949, such a distinction became impossible—not because the
CCP’s influence weakened but rather because it was too strong. First
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) became a modern, nationalist
state with a high degree of political, economic and cultural unity.
Only Taiwan was under the control of the Nationalist government,
and there were no regional strongmen. Second, although there were
other legal, democratic parties, they all existed under the leadership
of the CCP. Even after the space for these democratic parties’
political activities expanded following the reform and “opening up” in
1978, the 1982 constitution provides that the system is still one of
cooperation and consultation by multiple parties under the leadership
11
of the CCP. Through various formal (for example, the Chinese
Political Consultative Congress) and informal irregular meetings with
non-party figures and institutions, the CCP gathers and selectively
adopts the political advice of other political parties. Some leaders of
12
these democratic parties are also CCP members. Third, the vast
majority of social elites, whether in government, universities,
commerce, or social organizations, are party members. Other elites
who are not party members accept the political leadership of CCP
and most of them are staunch communists.13 Finally, within the CCP
are some “radicals,” whose political views might be considered
dissident by Westerners. In this sense, though the Party consistently
proclaims itself to be the vanguard of the proletariat and the working
class, and describes its highest ideal and ultimate aim to be the
14
realization of communism, even before the declaration of “the three

11. XIAN FA [Constitution] pmbl., para. 10 (1982) (P.R.C.).
12. As far as I know, the former or current leaders of such political parties as Democratic
League, China National Democratic Consultation Association, Zi Gong Party, and Taiwan
Democratic Self-government League were or are CCP members.
13. Two examples are the late and only non-CCP Vice Presidents of PRC: Song Qinqlin,
wife of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, applied and was approved for membership in the CCP right before her
death; and Rong Yiren, China’s leading “red capitalist,” was identified in a New China News
Agency obituary as a “solider for communism.”
14. 16TH CCP NAT’L CONF., CONSTITUTION OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA
general princs. (2002) [hereinafter CCP CONST.].
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representatives,”15 the Party also emphasizes that it was the vanguard
of the entire Chinese people and that it sought to represent the
16
interests of the greatest number of people. In this sense, the CCP is
another “nationalist” party. Its political program, despite having
suffered mistakes of the right and the left (including the serious
mistake of the Cultural Revolution), is widely accepted by the people.
Owing to the CCP’s political program and tight organizational
structure, its influence is ubiquitous at every level and in every aspect
of contemporary Chinese society; it determines the direction of
society and government. Though there may be differences and
conflicts within the party-state, there is no external influence on the
government other than the Party: there is no such thing as
government policy independent from the CCP; there is nothing else
truly influential, not even the military policy imagined by Western
scholars. In this view, as a matter of fact, the CCP is not only the
strength at the core of every undertaking in China, it is also the also
the mechanism for the mobilization, integration, and political
representation of all social forces and classes of PRC.
In
contemporary China, nearly every political force has either been
integrated into the CCP, or, as in the case of former and present
capitalists, counter-revolutionaries, bad elements, and rightists during
the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), denied political expression.
However, in the more than two decades since China began its reform
and “opening up” in 1978, and especially following the inclusion of
the concept of the “the three representatives” in the Party’s and
PRC’s constitutions, the CCP has pursued becoming a governing
party that represents the basic interests of the greatest number of
people and that has daily strengthened its ability as a governing
party.17
Therefore, distinguishing the status of party and government
officials is truly not that important. At every administrative level in
the PRC, the head of the administrative unit is not only a party
member, but the number two leader (for example, the deputy party

15. It is emphasized that CCP represents the fundamental interests of the overwhelming
majority of the Chinese people, represents the development trend of China’s advanced
productive forces, and represents the orientation of China’s advanced culture. It is widely
considered an important change of CCP in terms of its organizational constitution and political
ideology.
16. Cf. 7TH CCP NAT’L CONF., CONSTITUTION OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA
(1945); 8TH CCP NAT’L CONF., CONSTITUTION OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA (1956).
17. XIAN FA art. 1 (1982).
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secretary) of the party organization at that level, while among the
deputy leaders of an administrative unit (for example, Vice Mayor of
a city), only one person is generally not a party member. Party and
governmental officials are interchangeable, for example, most
governors eventually assume a position as provincial Party secretary,
and many provincial Party secretaries have previously served as
governors or other officials. This is the pattern from the center down
to the lowest level. Indeed, historically, few officials who have
specialized in or worked only in Party affairs and never in the
government enter the highest, core policy-making positions of the
Party organization.
This pattern holds true all the branches of government and
administration regardless of the breadth of their responsibilities. For
example, at all levels of government, from the municipal to the
national, the chairs of the People’s Congresses and People’s Political
Consultative Conferences, as well as the chiefs of all but a few
government agencies, are the party secretaries of the leading party
18
19
group in those units.
The institutions charged with administering justice (the People’s
Courts and People’s Procuratorates) are certainly no exception.
Since 1949, all the Presidents of the People’s Supreme Court and the
Chief Procurator of the Supreme Procuratorate, except Shen Junru,
the first President of People’s Supreme Court, have been CCP
members and secretaries of the leading Party group of the
organization. Although there is commonly a non-CCP-member Vice
President or Deputy Procurator, they are all carefully selected by the
CCP organizational branch and trusted by the CCP; in some
particularly important policy decisions, these non-Party officials may
be invited to participate in an expanded meeting of the leading party
group of their institution.
Given such a structure, it is not only hard to distinguish among
social, administrative, or Party interference in the judicial system and
its operation, it is also unnecessary to make this distinction. To insist
on the distinction is to apply a standard Western model of a judiciary,
inapposite for China. It fits China into a procrustean bed, akin to
“cutting one’s feet to fit shoes” or “marking a boat to see where one
has dropped a knife in a river.” This sort of “research” is not only

18. A leading party group is a CCP organization set in a state organ, people’s organization,
and other non-party organization.
19. Currently, probably the foreign ministry is the only exception.
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meaningless; it also blurs and confuses the real problems to be dealt
with in the Chinese judicial system and can, moreover, lead to
mistaken solutions. In my view, what is truly important is for us to
discover, examine, and study concretely the shortcomings and merits
of influence on and interference in the legal system (whatever its
sources), and to determine how to adjust and improve the
performance of China’s judiciary, as well as make it just, efficient, and
effective.
It should be pointed out that because of the Party’s ubiquitous
institutional presence and because of the nature of the social
revolution in China, the Party’s organizations and leaders (through
administrative and other agencies) have directly and indirectly
influenced, interfered in, and even at times manipulated the judicial
process. However, we cannot, indeed, we should not, simply look at
this as unfair interference. To be sure, the Party’s mistaken
interference in the judicial system and its policy errors have led to
some disastrous consequences. Yet even during the most extreme
moments, such as Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), there were CCP
organizations and officials, who, within the scope of their ability and
influence, prevented and reduced the unfairness or radicalism in some
cases, including instances in the judicial sphere. Although today it is
quite popular to attribute all the problems of the PRC to the CCP or
the revolution led by the CCP, it is hard to imagine that the current
state of Chinese society and the judicial system would necessarily be
better off without the modern revolution and economic development
led by the CCP. This is a counterfactual, and I will not develop the
argument here; I am willing to let history be the final judge.
However, if one thinks the revolution led by the CCP was inevitable
and on balance improved China, then one has to accept the CCP and
its modeling of China’s modern judiciary. Though we can argue
about whether the costs are worth it, there are no benefits without
costs.
Today, although the CCP has adopted “relying on law to rule the
country” (yifa zhiguo) and judicial independence is inscribed in the
Constitution, party organizations and individuals persist in
influencing and interfering with the judiciary. However, although
these interferers are sometimes leading cadres who “wave the flag” of
the local Party organization, it does not mean that this individual’s
interference represents the Party’s or that particular party
organization’s interference. To the contrary, some of them are
violating CCP principles, policies, and disciplinary rules. A county
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Party chief may interfere with a county court’s handling of a case; if
he or she acts out of personal interest, it is illegal; if the action is
driven by “local interest,” it is at a minimum unfair and
inappropriate. The Court or Procuratorate has a basis in law and
Party disciplinary rules to reject such interference, and both
institutions have certainly resisted this sort of meddling, though not
always successfully.20 Moreover, sometimes the party’s apparent
interference is merely issuing an opinion (pishi) as a response to a
“hot” social issue. Even in the absence of this opinion, the relevant
court, acting solely on the basis of the law, would have reached a
similar result. In a sense, the Party’s issuing an opinion is simply a
necessary political or public relations gesture by the CCP, acting in its
role as the governing party that is serving the people. It is a necessary
political strategy that shows responsiveness to outcries from the
people. Such gestures certainly do not fit the model of separation of
powers and are often criticized by many legal scholars who, based on
their knowledge of Western judicial practices, think that the CCP
should keep quiet about a case awaiting trial. Yet maybe the gesture
is necessary for the majority of Chinese people who are not interested
in foreign comparisons, and want merely justice and social solidarity.
From a legal perspective, I find the Party’s interference unjustified
and sometimes am disposed to join in the criticism. However, from a
political perspective and from an objective or neutral position, I do
not see why the legal perspective is necessarily more moral and more
reasonable than the political perspective, and why the judicial
position should always be privileged over the political position.
Perhaps, my position is tendentious and conflicts with my self-interest
as a legal professional. However, in my view, the Party’s interference
may reasonably be seen as a performance of its political functions of
social integration and representation.
Another difficulty in making a distinction is that an
administrative agency’s interference may be arising directly or
indirectly from a CCP decision or policy determination. For example,
in order to attract foreign investment, a local Party organization, the
local government, or government agencies may instruct (zhishi) the
local court to “take care of” (zhaogu) a foreign investor in a
particular case. Such actions do not comport with a pure model of
judicial autonomy, but at the same time, the local Standing
Committee of People’s Congress or other government agencies may

20. See ZHU, supra note 4, at 129-31, where I analyze such cases.
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enact a local statute of general applicability that requires local courts
to implement the CCP policy of encouraging economic development.
Regardless of the form it takes, this sort of interference cannot be
said to come from the government rather than the Party because it is,
in fact, reflecting the political judgments and decisions of the Party
center or its local branches. When we turn to the real world to look
closely at how such influence is exercised, we find an even more
complicated situation. In general, one can say that the final decisionmaking power lies in the CCP. However, at the level of everyday
experience, whether interference comes from the Party, the
government, the People’s Congress, or the media or individuals
within them all depends upon the position and actual influence of the
interfering party, upon the institutions he or she thinks is the most
effective instrument for intervening, and upon the actual channels he
or she uses to affect the court’s judgment. It is not always a CCP
organization that is the most influential in such matters. Like other
people, the Chinese are very practical. They will try anything and
everything they think might be effective at exerting influence on the
courts.
Distinctions among the Party, government, People’s
Congress, or the mass media are not made. Nor are distinctions
between lawful and unlawful methods, such as personal connections
with and even bribery of judges.
Even within the judiciary (Courts and Procuratorates), there are
various legal, semi-legal, and illegal interferences, both legal and
administrative in nature. Sometimes, it is hard to determine whether
the influence is Party or non-Party, institutional or personal, or legal
or administrative. A Supreme People’s Court’s decision, even a
judicial interpretation from its adjudication committee, the most
professional organ within the Court, may still be a response to a
policy decision by the Central Committee of CCP. For example, in
December 2003, Supreme Court President Xiao Yang announced that
the Court had issued a “leading opinion” (zhidao yijian) following
intensive study by the Court’s Party branch of a statement from Hu
Jintao, General Secretary of the CCP.21 In this case, it was not simply
a matter of restating a CCP Central Committee policy. Rather, the
decision addressed a real, pervasive internal problem of the court
system. Moreover, a higher court judge or judges’ unfair reversal of a
lower level decision may be a product of undue social influences on
those higher court judges disguised with CCP rhetoric. Finally, even if

21. LIAOWANG XINWEN ZHOUKAN, Oct. 13, 2003, at 20.
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the Party interferes in a particular case, for example, through the
increasingly less common practice of utilizing the Party secretary of
the politics and law committee (zhengfa wei), the instructions, though
written, are general rather than specific. Like any other texts, they
need interpretation. Is such interference an interference, and in what
sense? Actually, judges who try such cases may use such an
instruction to hide their personal judgment, even their partiality.
Accordingly, I conclude, first, that the influence of the CCP upon
the judiciary is general and diffuse; it comes not only from party
institutions and party leaders, but also through many other avenues.
Second, although the CCP has its own ideology and exercises
significant influence on the judiciary, taken as a whole, this ideology
is not necessarily incompatible with the general view of justice shared
by ordinary people. The organizational principles of the CCP are in
conflict with the operation of professional logic in the legal/judicial
system, but in concert with China’s social development, the
legal/judicial profession in China is institutionalizing itself. Third, as a
concrete, operating political party within society, the CCP is not
essentialist; every sort of person, interest group, and political force
may try to use the mechanism of the Party to influence or interfere in
the operation of the judiciary. Their actions have both a positive and
negative affect on the formation and development of the judicial
system. Fourth, on the level of everyday life, not only is it difficult to
identify the pure party interference, it is also important to note that
such interference has a strongly pragmatic and opportunistic
character.
Therefore, I would argue that separating Party
interference from other interference cannot further our
understanding of the operation of the basic level legal system.
Moreover, other than exacerbating an ideological and essentialist
understanding of the CCP and China, such distinctions have no
intellectual significance.
III. WHAT IS THE FRAME OF REFERENCE?
Even it were possible to identify a purely Party influence, such
research is untenable because of the problem of an implied frame of
reference. Indeed, there are many flaws in the PRC’s judiciary, and
they are probably attributable to the CCP’s ideology. However, I
prefer to trace them to the unprecedented social transformation of
China during the last one hundred years. One of my aims in writing
Sending Law to the Countryside was to try to identify and find
solutions for these flaws. Perhaps, because my effort was insufficient,
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my analysis not trenchant, my vision too narrow, indeed blind in
places, my work has its shortcomings. Nevertheless, it is hard to
construct, indeed even to imagine, a standard frame of reference,
whether experiential or ideal, for the political-judicial relationship
that could be used to objectively measure the CCP’s influence and
interference at the basic level of the judiciary and then evaluate the
pros and cons of such influence.
All modern countries have political parties, which despite the
commonly recognized principle of judicial independence, influence or
interfere in judicial matters in various ways. The extent of the
phenomenon may be less than in China, but it is nonetheless fairly
common. Actually, without the active participation and influence of
political parties, it is hard to imagine the existence or perpetuation of
an institutional judicial independence. My language may seem a bit
cynical, but it describes a historical and contemporary reality. Was it
not out of loyalty to the Federalist Party and determined resistance to
the Republic-Democratic Party that Chief Justice Marshall created
the system of judicial review, which serves as the core of American
judicial independence?22
Some may dismiss my example as characteristic of the early stage
of judicial independence. However, even in many Western countries
today, judicial independence depends on and indeed is guaranteed to
a great extent by party politics. Without party politics there would be
no judicial independence in these countries. For example, in the
United States, the two political parties exert influence on the courts
and judicial process through the system in which the Senate advises
and consents to the President’s nomination of federal judges. Also, as
the example of the Warren Court shows, some American judges
voluntarily make their judgments in accord with their party’s
ideology. In addition, some states have institutions of election and
23
recall. To different degrees, all these institutions and practices are
influenced by party politics. Personally, I regard these political
parties’ influence on the judicial system as generally acceptable and
lawful. Moreover, I recognize that neither in degree nor character

22. Oliver Wendell Holmes, John Marshall, in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES: SELECTIONS
LETTERS, SPEECHES, JUDICIAL OPINIONS, AND OTHER WRITINGS OF OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES, JR. 206-09 (Richard A. Posner ed., 1992). I discuss the background of
Marbury v. Madison in Zhiddu ruhe xingchengde? [How was the System Formed?], 1998
BIJIAOFA YANJIU [RES. IN COMP. L.], no. 1 (1998).
23. HENRY J. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS OF THE
COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, ENGLAND, AND FRANCE 37-42 (7th ed. 1998).
FROM THE
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can they be equated to the political influence or interference to which
Chinese judges are subject. However, the acceptance by Upham and
me, as well as by many others of the ineluctability of parties’ political
interference does not mean that we can deny that it is indeed political
influence.
“Many” does not mean everyone or on all issues. In America,
there have been instances of what Judge Robert Bork and other
scholars regard as egregious interference—for example, the struggle
in 1987 between Republicans and Democrats over President Reagan’s
nomination of Bork to the Supreme Court. At least Judge Bork
regarded it as inappropriate interference, or in his words, a “political
24
seduction of the law.” Is this an overstatement prompted by Judge
Bork’s anger? Let us imagine an alternative outcome in which a
Republican-dominated Senate confirmed Bork. In the eyes of
adamant Bork opponents Senator Ted Kennedy and Senator Joseph
Biden, who in the Democratic-controlled Senate was chair of the
Judiciary Committee, would that result not also have been political?
Actually, the controversy over Judge Bork’s nomination reveals only
the tip of the iceberg of the influence of disciplined American party
politics over judicial affairs. It was an exceptional case, but less
controversy in a confirmation case does not mean the absence of
politics and political influence; politically non-controversial is not
politically neutral or politics-free.25 The nomination and confirmation
of federal judges in the United States is becoming more and more
political.
Politics and political interference are evident not only in the
process of nominating and confirming judges, but also in some
concrete cases. The interference comes not only from politicians in
their role as party leaders, but also through the willing cooperation of
politicians serving as judges. Sometimes, such efforts may be out of

24. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE
LAW (1990).
25. A recent empirical study found that “the more important the court, the greater the
difficulty of having the person confirmed. Although the confirmation rates have fallen and the
length of the confirmation process has lengthened dramatically, the ex-post facto measures of
judicial quality of circuit court nominees . . . or judicial independence have been decreasing over
time . . . . The most troubling results strongly indicate that circuit court judges who turn out to
be the most successful judges . . . faced the most difficult confirmation battles . . .” The study
speculates that “[p]ossibly, senators of the party in opposition to the President really care only
about preventing the best judges from being on the circuit court because they will have the most
impact.” John R. Lott, Jr., The Judicial Confirmation Process: The Difficulty with Being Smart, 2
J. OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD., 407, 443-47 (2005).
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bounds. The most famous or infamous instance is Chief Justice John
26
Marshall’s handling of Marbury v. Madison. In that case, there was
no party leader demanding that he handle the case in a certain way,
but his aggressive personality and firm party ideology motivated him
to make perhaps the greatest decision in the American constitutional
system. In the last fifty years, the Berger and Rehnquist courts have,
to a certain degree, been much the same: more political than
juridical.27 The most recent instance is the controversial case of Bush
v. Gore.28
Please note that in no way am I saying that American political
parties’ influence on the operation of courts is the same as the CCP’s
influence upon basic courts in China. The two are very different.
The United States has a two-party system, while in China, the
29
“[Communist] party is the leader of all”; in the United States,
political influence on the judiciary probably comes mainly from
judges’ self-conscious loyalty to party ideology and platforms, while in
China the influence is a function of the party’s demands on and
disciplinary control over judges; and in the United States, with
lifetime tenure and high salaries as protection, some judges will not
hesitate to “rebel against” their party,30 while in China, judges, who
are civil servants, can find comfort only in the supportive writings of a
few scholars. Thus, I recognize that in terms of parties’ political
interference in the judicial system, the differences between China and
the United States are ones both of degree and character.
Moreover, I want to point out that nothing I have said implies
that in the course of transforming its judiciary, China should not study
the United States and other Western countries. To the contrary, the
PRC is in the midst of studying these examples, and out of a concern
for the need to address China’s problems, I approve and support this
effort.

26. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
27. LUCAS A. POWE JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS (2000); EARL
M. MALTZ, THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF WARREN BURGER, 1969-1986 (2000); TINSLEY E.
YARBROUGH, THE REHNQUIST COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION (2001); REHNQUIST
JUSTICE: UNDERSTANDING THE COURT DYNAMIC (Earl M. Maltz ed., 2003).
28. Cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000 ELECTION, THE
CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS (2001); THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE, AND THE SUPREME
COURT (Cass R. Sunstein & Richard A. Epstein eds., 2001).
29. 2 MAO ZEDONG, MAO ZEDONG ZHUZUO XUANDU [SELECTED READINGS OF MAO
ZEDONG’S WORKS] 852 (1986).
30. Cf. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES (1985).
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However, the position I have taken above has nothing to do with
the frame of reference issue with which I want to engage. The
question remains: what is the proper frame of reference for
measuring and evaluating the relationship between party politics and
the judiciary. The American? The British? The German? The
French? Or should I construct a standard model based on the judicial
practice of all of the nations in the world? But why should they be
basis for the standard, and is that standard appropriate for China?
From where does such a comparative law model or statistical
standard derive its normative force? From where does its justness
come? If, as Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives Tip
O’Neil said, “all politics are local,” why should local judicial politics
adopt a universal standard? We cannot get to this form of universal
standards unless I adopt a linear version of modernization theory,
which I steadfastly reject, but Professor Upham believes I support.
Should I dismiss all the empirical evidence and directly develop
an ideal model frame of reference by which to examine the relations
between the judiciary and political parties? This is, of course,
possible and really not that hard. Or, I should derive such a model
relationship from the separation of powers (with its Western origins
and cultural coloring) or other similar concepts? I believe I can do it
quite well if practice is not considered. But then, unless we are an
essentialist who not only believes that there is one true, correct,
universal, and transcendent definition of the relationship between
political parties and the judiciary, but also believes that we have
perfect access to that definition, we still cannot prove that this ideal
or deduced model for political party-judicial relations is indeed
legitimate. Perhaps it is possible to broaden or loosen the standard a
bit, consider the national context where a judiciary is located, and
construct a “comparatively reasonable” relationship between political
parties and the judiciary. But methodologically, this would still be an
artificial construct which would certainly deviate from the American
standard implicit in Upham’s critique, comparative law’s ideal model,
or the essentialist standard, because one would have to return to the
contextualized, consequentialist, functionalist model by which I abide
in my book. One must come back to China’s social context, where
the judiciary operates, and evaluate the relationship between party
politics, the government, and the judiciary in considering the
systematic consequences of such a judiciary in the Chinese society.
Even if all this is possible, it is hard to avoid innumerable
controversies over the reasonableness of the construct. For example,
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I consider that in Sending Law to the Countryside, I constructed a
reasonable analytical structure and frame of reference for evaluating
the relationship between the Party and the judiciary, and provided a
focused discussion of a series of related issues. However, Professor
Upham finds in it an absence “of politics and political power.”
Through numerous, useless publications, we could debate forever the
reasonableness of the framework, but we will get nowhere.
I say useless because not all debates end in agreement or
intellectual enlightenment, and, even we can reach an agreement over
the frame of reference, does this frame have any practical uses?
Whether we deduce it from the general, abstract it from empirical
materials, or make a standard directly out of American or some other
national experience, in the end, it mainly provides us with just
another frame of reference for criticizing contemporary Chinese
judicial practice, making us think that we have truth and justice in our
hands. But it does not help us either to understand China’s reality or
to transform that reality. Indeed, we may be worse off than we
started. This sort of frame of reference is doomed to fail because
from the beginning, the current relationship between political parties
and the judiciary is neither derived from a concept or ideology, nor
modeled on a foreign standard. The current state of China’s judicial
practice is a product of China’s modern historical and social
development, a social reality constructed from various social
variables.
IV. THE PARTY AS AN INSTITUTIONAL ALTERNATIVE
My response cannot stop here. Otherwise, readers may think it
is not a strong response, but rather at most a defensive pleading for
my methodology that, even if successful, merely dodges Upham’s
arrow. It might enhance the misimpression about the relationship
between the CCP and the judiciary within China and the implied
universal, normative character of American-type judicial politics.
More importantly, such a brief response leaves unexplored topics
that are inherently deserving of further consideration and it is
therefore unfair to Chinese contemporary history, the CCP, and the
Chinese judiciary to stop here. So, in this section, I want to engage in
a thought experiment and argue for the contextual reasonableness of
the relationship between the CCP and the judiciary and for its
necessity in China’s social transformation. If my argument is sound, it
will further demonstrate the problems with Professor Upham’s
criticism of my book, not only in his methodology, but also in his
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value judgments. Further, such a social science analysis of the
relationship between Party and the judiciary may provide a new
frame of reference for understanding and evaluating the issue of the
relationship between the CCP and the PRC’s judiciary. Even if my
effort fails, it will advance the academic research on China’s judicial
system.
The relationship between the party-state and the judiciary in
China evolved over the course of China’s modernization. Since 1840,
China’s most important task has been to transform itself
successfully—economically from an agricultural society to an
industrial and commercial society; politically from a community
unified by culture to a modern nation-state unified by politics; and
culturally from an rural society dominated by Confucian humanities
31
to an urban one led by the social sciences. In terms of key variables
such as time, population, and geographic size, this was an
unprecedented historical transformation. Without a vigorous, core
political power, it is unimaginable that this change could have
occurred in such a short time and in the face of a fiercely competitive
international society. The early history of the Republic of China is
clear evidence. Only when the GMD and CCP appeared as national,
revolutionary parties and twice cooperated, did Chinese society begin
its first steps toward unification, and only in Second World War, with
the assistance from Soviet Union and the United States, did China
win its first war against foreign invasion since 1840.
It should be noted that the GMD and CCP are profoundly
different, but looked at from another angle, whatever their
differences, both are different from contemporary Western political
parties. Both the GMD and CCP were aware that the task and
historical burden of the nation was the economic, political, cultural,
and social transformation of China. To achieve this goal in the wake
of imperial China’s collapse and in the face of a fiercely competitive
world, they had to use every possible means to mobilize and integrate
all political forces in the service of national unity, independence, and
freedom, which are preconditions to social and economic
development. What I have described is the process of jianguo, which
is commonly translated as “state-building.” I prefer to translate it as
the constitution (or re-constitution) of the nation-state. It is in this

31. ZHU SULI, DAOLU TONGXIANG CHENGSHI—ZHUANXING ZHONGGUO DE FAZHI OF
[ALL ROADS LEAD TO CITIES—RULE OF LAW IN A TRANSFORMING CHINA] intro. (2004)
[hereinafter SULI, ALL ROADS LEAD TO CITIES].
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historical context of constituting the nation-state that the CCP and
GMD came into being. In contrast, the political parties in the West
were established and operated within already-constituted nations.
They were political organizations that served as vehicles for common
interests within these constituted nations, and generally speaking, did
not confront the historical problems and tasks that faced the Chinese
political parties, nor did they have the long-term political goals of the
Chinese parties.
Because of this historical task, both the CCP and GMD were
revolutionary parties, rather than merely political parties holding
power. They had to engage in armed struggle to gain the power, and
then, even after they gained political power, they had to continue to
play the role of a revolutionary party, leading society in the
completion of social revolution, land reform, and industrialization.
All these historical tasks dictated that both parties were elitist: they
had to not only be able to propose national reform, but also to
mobilize and lead the masses to accomplish the transformation in
order to construct or constitute a modern nation-state, precisely the
original meaning of constitution. However, this task could not be
accomplished by the political elites without the collective effort of the
nation. Thus, both parties had to be capable of integrating all kinds
of other social forces, representing different interests, and in this
sense, they became the parties of the masses.32 As a consequence of
this historical context, the CCP and GMD developed not only strong
political ideologies, but also strict party discipline and tight internal
organizations to insure effective implementation of party policy.
Their party structures emphasize “democratic centralism,” “organized
democracy,” and “disciplined freedom,” which all seem to be
antinomies or oxymorons, but were actual practices within the
parties. Party members who violate Party discipline will be sanctioned
or even expelled.33
Therefore, such parties are not only an important motivating and
leading force for social change; they have also been a critical
institutional alternative in modern Chinese society. Before they take
power, they are organizational mechanisms and social mobilizers.
The party organization, party leaders, and even ordinary party
members are thus alternatives to the conventional bureaucracy and
32. Cf. CCP CONST., supra note 14, general princ. [Is the 2002 one being referenced here?
The year was not noted.]; CONST. OF THE GUOMINDANG preface [hereinafter GMD CONST.].
33. CCP CONST., supra note 14, general princs.; GMD CONST., supra note 32, arts. 3, 4, 5,
ch. 12.
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bureaucrats. Given the absence of the professionals and bureaucrats
China needed to order its society, after taking power, besides
continuing their function of social mobilization and organization, the
parties, to a certain extent, could not but assume the role of the
bureaucracy, and in the course of that process, their members became
the bureaucrats that modern China needed. The so-called partystate, or rule by the party, that the GMD first proposed and
34
emphasized is therefore not only natural, but also inevitable. The
CCP always opposed the GMD’s idea of “party-state,” but in reality,
such a pattern characterized the CCP both before,35 and certainly also
after its victory in 1949. Indeed, the CCP’s party-state was even more
pronounced than the GMD’s. Thus, either the GMD or the CCP has
been the most important part of the constitutional and governmental
structure of modern China and the core force of that modernization.
The Party’s objective is social transformation. Accordingly, it
cannot base itself directly on democracy—the people, after all have a
tendency to be conservative and short-sighted—but must insist on the
central role of the Party’s elites and leadership group in guiding the
revolution and social transformation. But at the same time, in order
to lead the masses, the Party cannot abandon them. In order to be
representative, both the GMD and CCP had to maintain a certain
degree of internal democracy (whether it was called “democratic
centralism” or “democracy with organization”). Parties become a
quasi-constitutional structure in another sense as they serve as an
alternative for or a necessary stage on the road toward
36
constitutionalism: within the party, party discipline and guiding
principles perform the function of law and statutes. In his analysis of
the party-state of China during the twentieth century, Harvard
professor William C. Kirby pointed out that the goal of a party-state
is not to lead the government, but to reform the Chinese people and

34. In 1928, the Standing Committee of the GMD stated that the Party was the Supreme
Tutelar of the nation. In 1931, the Nationalist Government invited selected representatives of
rural society, labor, business, and the education sector to convene and draw up a Tutelary
Period Provisional Constitution of the Republic of China, Article 30 of which specifies that
during the Tutelary Period, GMD will represent the National Conference to direct and
supervise the National Government. XU JUHUA, JIANG JIESHI CHENBAI LU [A RECORD OF
JIANG JIESHI’S SUCCESS AND FAILURE] ch. 12.
35. 1 XIAOPING, supra note 6, at 12.
36. Sun Yat-sen proposed three stages to China’s constitutionalism: the period of military
government, the period of political tutelage, and the period of constitutional government. See
Sun Yat-sen, Guomin zhengfu jianguo dagang [A Constitutional Program of the National
Government], in ZHONGSHEN, supra note 5, at 126-29.
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recast them into citizens of new nation-state. The party-state, he
noted, is a political entity pursuing social and economic development;
its aim is complete mobilization of all China’s people and total
industrialization.37
This historical task cannot be fulfilled within a short period, so
the party-state structure may last quite long since the taking over
power does not equal constitutionalism, nor accomplishment of the
self-imposed historical task. Parties want to accomplish their ideals
through the coercive state and governmental power under their
control. However, when in power, the requirement of effective and
stable governance will force parties to gradually adjust their policies;
to enact laws; to establish conventional institutions, such as the
National Congress or National People’s Congress; to recruit qualified
civil servants and set up bureaucracy; and to establish a judiciary and
improve its function. It is a long process of transformation from a
revolutionary party to a governing party, a process of transformation
from a pioneer and elitist party to a popular party. Because these
processes of reformation of the Party and institutionalization of
modern nation-state take time, they are still ongoing in the PRC.
Thus, it is understandable why in contemporary China, complete
judicial independence is impossible and why the relatively low degree
of party interference in the judiciary in the developed countries of the
West is not likely to be systematized in China. Actually, in
contemporary China, the entire modern state apparatus, including the
judiciary, consists of inventions created by the governing political
parties on the basis of their political ideals, policies, and
organizational structures. The specific forms, such as the GMD’s
“partyization of the judiciary,” or the CCP’s “sending law to the
countryside” and political and judicial committee (zhengfawei) may
be accidental, but the comprehensive leadership, influence, and
control of the parties was inevitable and pervasive. Thus, we have the
phenomenon that I have described above: in contemporary China, it
is well nigh impossible to distinguish what is and what is not the
CCP’s influence and interference, for in fact the judiciary is the CCP’s
creation.
Although GMD and CCP had some commonalities, there were
also significant differences between them, most notably the different

37. William C. Kirby, Renshi 20 Shiji zhongguo [Understanding China of Twentieth
Century], 2001 21ST CENTURY, no. 10, 114-24 (2001), available at http://www.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/
wk_wzdetails.asp?id=1523.
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social forces that they integrated and represented. From the 1920s
onward, the GMD inherited most of the technocrats from the late
Qing dynasty, as well as the vast majority of professionals and mid- to
upper-level intellectuals, for, as the party in power, the GMD
provided them with room for their knowledge and skill. Moreover,
another major constituent force of the GMD was the military officers
who had graduated from the Huangpu Military College and who
served as another institutional alternative to the bureaucracy.
By contrast, despite consistently seeking a united front during its
military struggles, the CCP had no way to attract the broad
participation of such groups, not only because it had no space to
deploy their skills, but also because for these elites, the CCP was a
much riskier choice, especially in its military struggle for national
power. Moreover, unlike the GMD, the CCP also did not have a
captive military college to train its officers, who instead got their
experience and skills on the battlefields. During wartime, most
military officers of the CCP were trained in the battlefields. Thus, the
CCP was less capable than the GMD of utilizing modern or Paramodern institutions and professionals.
The CCP membership came mainly from peasants and other mid
and lower social classes.
Because of the peasants’ mode of
production, they tended to be less modern, less disciplined, and less
likely to be long-term thinkers. Thus, in order for the CCP to rely on
this mass base to make a successful revolution, it had to develop
stronger party organization and leadership, stricter discipline, and a
38
There is substantial research to show that
more radical ideology.
during the time that the GMD held power on the mainland, the actual
political power and influence of its party organization and party
members was substantially weaker than similarly situated CCP party
organizations and cadres. For example, the GMD’s propaganda and
organization ministers were much less influential than the CCP’s.
Such evidence is abundant.39 The differences between the CCP and
GMD lie in the social conditions from which they were constructed;
the ideological differences may not have been as important as many
people think.
The CCP’s stronger party organization and ideology
compensated for its lack of a bureaucratic system for modern

38. Cf. 1 MaoZedong, On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party, in Selected Works of Mao
Zedong, vol. 1, Peking, Foreign Language Press, 1975.
39. See supra note 8.
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government, but they also impeded the creation and development of
such a bureaucracy. Of course, the CCP felt no urgent need for a
bureaucracy, and long after it took power in 1949, it remained a
revolutionary party in character. There was no quick transformation
into a governing party; there was no effective formation of a decent
bureaucracy with technocrats, civil servants, and professionals, such
as judges and lawyers. In all aspects of governance, the CCP played a
decisive and dominant role. Political loyalty and ideological purity
became the important criteria for selecting government employees,
including those in the judiciary.40
Not until the 1980s did the CCP began to emphasize knowledge
and human talent, seeking to create a reformed cohort of cadres who
were more knowledgeable, professional, specialized, and younger.
This trend was fostered by the steady, rapid development of higher
education and a dramatic increase in university graduates. The 1993
Provisional Civil Service Act,41 which replaced recruitment through
political channels with selection by open, competitive exams,42
symbolizes this fundamental change. Similarly, the 1990s appearance
of criticism of the practice of discharged military officers serving as
judges43 was not accidental. Though it was initiated in academic
circles, it found an echo in the court system itself, indicating the rise
and increasing influence in the judiciary of the first generation of
post-Cultural Revolution trained legal professionals (most of whom
were around forty years old). They constituted a challenge for the
established institutional structure in the judiciary and led a series of
judicial reforms.44
40. Cf. DONG BIWU, DONG BIWU FAXUE WENJI [LEGAL WORKS OF DONG BIWU] (2001).
41. Guojia gongwuyuan zanxing tiaoli [Provisional Civil Service Act] (promulgated by the
State Council, Aug. 14, 1993, effective Oct. 1, 1993), available at http://www.china.org.cn/
chinese/MATERIAL/385908.htm. On January 1, 2006, the Provisional Act was superceded by
the Civil Servant Law (Zhonghua renmin gongheguo gongwuyuan fa). For the Chinese version,
see the website of the National People’s Congress, http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/common/
zw.jsp?label=WXZLK&id=337350&pdmc=110106. For an English language version, see
http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI_EN/Laws/GeneralLawsandRegulations/BasicLaws/t20060620_5
0863.jsp.
42. For a discussion of this Act, which is compared to the Pendleton Act that created the
United States Civil Service, see King K Tsao & John Abbott Worthley, Chinese Public
Administration: Change with Continuity during Political and Economic Development, 55 PUB.
ADMIN. REV., Mar.-Apr., 1995, at 169-74.
43. He Weifang, Fuzhuan junren jin fayuan [Discharged Military Officers Come to the
Courts], NANFANG ZHOUMO, Jan. 2, 1998.
44. Renmin fayue wunian gaige gangyao [A Five-Year Program for the Reform of People’s
Courts], 1999 ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO ZUIGAO RENMIN FAYUAN GONGBAO, no. 6
(1999).
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In the mid-1980s, the CCP proposed separating party and
45
government, but progress has been neither fast nor significant. It
seems to me that a prominent (though not the only) problem is that
parallel duplicative systems address the same matter—the Party and
the government have separate but corresponding organizations and
personnel. Moreover, the logic of the Party organization impedes its
becoming the logic of an organization with specialized functions.46
High transaction costs sharply reduce work efficiency. Also, because
of the Party’s hold on power, opportunists can use their position to
use ideological language to expand their influence and serve their
self-interest. Thus, the Party has consistently promoted strengthening
and improving party leadership,47 as well as establishing a new
relationship between the Party and the judiciary.48 China still faces an
enormous task of reform, and its performance is still subjected to
withering criticism from Western governments and scholars, much of
which is driven by their own ideology. I admit that some criticism is
justified and deserves the CCP’s attention. However, historically,
functionally, and consequentially, China under the CCP’s leadership
and governance has achieved great success. Most notably, the CCP
created a unique, innovative path to modernization in a country with
a large peasant economy and no modern constitution or political
institutions. Today, China’s political system may not entirely meet
our expectations, but the practical question is whether abolishing the
current system of CCP leadership would make China better off and
develop faster in the future, or, to put it as a counterfactual, without

45. Deng Xiaoping raised this idea in June 1986. 3 XIAOPING, supra note 6, at 164. In
September of that year, he further pointed out that the separation of Party and state should be
the top priority political reform. Id. at 179. Then, in October 1987, the 13th meeting of the CCP
Party Congress adopted Party General Secretary Zhao Ziyang’s report, Yanzhe you zhongguo
tesede shuihuizhuyi daolu qianjin [Advancing Along the Road of Socialism with Chinese
Characteristics], thereby formally listing party-state separation as the key to and the primary
task in reforming the political system.
46. Su Li, Fayuan de shenpan zhineng yu xingzheng guanli [The Adjudicative Function of
Courts and Administrative Management], 1999 ZHONGWAI FAXUE [CHINESE FOREIGN
JURISPRUDENCE], no. 5 (1999). Su Li is a pen name used by Zhu Suli.
47. Dang he guojia lingdao zhidu gaige [Reforming the System of Party and State
Leadership], August 18, 1980, in 2 XIAOPING, supra note 6.
48. For some of the most recent attempts, see Shenzhen jiangcheng dangzheng fenli
zheng’gai xianfeng [Shenzhen at the Forefront of the Political Reform Separating Party from
Government], GONGSHANG SHIBAO, Jan. 14, 2003. According to the article, this was the largest
political reform since the Party took power in 1949. Its key component was the separation of
the Party from the administrative and legislative systems, leading toward a Shenzhen municipal
government with a Western-style separation of powers, in which the municipal government, the
municipal government, and the courts were in a mutual balance of power.
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the CCP, could China have accomplished what it has accomplished. I
think not. In the last thirty years, to an extent, the CCP actually has
transformed itself and successfully led China’s reform and social
modernization.
This statement holds true for the judiciary. Although the recent
judicial reforms have, to an extent, been in response to pressures
accompanying economic transformation, the real organizational and
motivating force has been the CCP, including its leaders and
intellectuals. Reform has been implemented as a consequence of
Party principles and policies and through the exertion of party
organization discipline within the judiciary. I do not think every
reform measure is good or desirable, but on balance their benefits
outweigh their defects.49 For example, although the CCP’s control
seriously compromises the independence of the judicial system,
especially the independence of judges, in the absence of alternative
institutions that are not yet fully in place during this time of social
transformation, to some extent Party control has limited the
corruption, laxness, and partiality of the judiciary. This last point, I
should note, is the subject of considerable controversy among lawyers
and legal scholars. I, personally, respect others’ criticism, but
conclusions about China’s judicial system cannot be reached simply
through debates; they will come as the result of empirical research,
which requires time. I do not want to rush to judgment and am
willing to be critiqued and rebutted, but if we are to research China’s
modernization, especially the relationship between the Party, the
state, and the judicial system, then we must look at the question with
an open mind and take into account the historical and social context
of these institutions. Evaluations and judgments based solely on
Western experience or ideology, or out of the strategic considerations
of Western politicians have no academic value or possible practical
applicability. From the perspective of democratic theory and
evolutionary economics, valid institutional development and
innovation arises from competition. The vicissitudes along the road
of social development are not predetermined. The same is true for
the evolving relationship between the party-state and the judicial
system. It is therefore critical for us to examine this relationship as
scholars and not as ideologues.

49. Cf. SULI, ALL ROADS LEAD TO CITIES, supra note 31.
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V. A NEW MODEL FOR THE
STUDIES OF CHINA’S JUDICIAL SYSTEM
Once we understand the role that the CCP has played in modern
China in social mobilization and representation, in nation building,
and in the creation of institutions, then we must maintain a degree of
moderate academic vigilance against the apparently successful
Western experience with the judiciary and rule of law. Vigilance is
not hostility. Rather, simply because of current Western institutions’
ostensible success, we should not take them as a decontextualized
standard when they are in fact embedded in and abstracted from
particular historical and theoretical contexts. And then, once China
fails to comport with this standard, it becomes an object for
politicized academic criticism and reform. Such an approach is fairly
common among both Western and Chinese scholars. I am not
accusing them of intentionally using ideology as a critical standard.
Many of them work hard to understand China and wish it well.
However, their social experience imperceptibly impedes them from
placing themselves in the position of the Chinese and considering
China’s current situation from a value-neutral perspective.
Inevitably, our life experience impedes and defines the scope of our
imagination.
Beyond their social environment and history, what has also
influenced Western scholars, and through them some Chinese
scholars as well, is Western scholarship on the relationship between
the party-state and the judiciary in the former Soviet Union and
communist countries in Eastern Europe. This scholarship and its
underlying theoretical framework may have prevented them from
realizing the uniqueness of China’s experience. In the Soviet Union
and formerly communist Eastern European countries, the major
function of the Communist Party was seen to be, and indeed is, to
control the bureaucracy, including the judicial professionals who had
been in place before the Communist Party existed. This research not
only enhanced the notion of an inherent separation of and conflict of
interests between the Communist Party and the bureaucracy, it also
left the impression that the bureaucracy always came first and that
Party control followed.
This conclusion is reasonable and,
considering the context of these countries, possibly correct. For
example, in the Soviet Union’s early years, many Red Army generals,
such as the famous Marshal Mikhail Nikolaevieh Tukhachevsk and
the hero of World War II, Marshal Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov,
were previously military officers of the Tsar. In order to secure its
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leadership and control, the Communist Party sent political
commissars to ensure the implementation of the party’s lines in the
Red Army. The Party followed the same approach in many
enterprises and governmental agencies, and this practice was followed
by other Eastern European countries.
China, however, was not like this. Long before CCP took power
in China, its leaders clearly understood that China was different from
the Soviet Union. In 1936, when a presidium political commissar,
Yang Chengwu, was reappointed as the military commander, Mao
Zedong explained the difference between the Soviet Red Army was
and the Chinese one: in the Soviet Union, political commissars were
sent to supervise military officers, most of whom were former White
Army officers, while in China all the military officers and political
military officers in the Red Army were trained by the CCP and
50
experienced in combat. Yang Chengwu later became one of the
most famous generals of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), but
few knew that he had previously served as a political commissar;
Yang was not unique in the PLA. His career path, like that of
individuals in other professions, was common.
Therefore, the model abstracted from the experiences of the
former Soviet bloc is not entirely appropriate for modern China. In
modern China, whether the GMD or the CCP, and whether before or
after one of these parties held power, to varying degrees the general
pattern was that the party preceded the government, the judiciary,
and the armed forces. Before the GMD and CCP, there was hardly a
51
There is
modern nation-state, government, judiciary, and army.
some truth in the CCP propaganda, “without the CCP there is no new
China.” Thus, the time sequence of the appearance of the Party and
the modern institutions of China demands a new framework or model
of research.
As I have said, this paper aims partly at Chinese scholars of the
current legal system because some of them avoid any discussion of
political parties. It may be from disgust with the extreme leftist
politics of the Cultural Revolution, fear, or excessive sensitivity.

50. YANG CHENGWU, YANG CHENGWU HUIYILU [MEMOIRS OF YANG CHENGWU] 334
(1987).
51. The first national conference of the GMD convened in 1924, and the first military
college, Huangpu Military Academy, which became the major source of soldiers for the national
army under the GMD, opened in 1925. The national government of the GMD took power in
1927. The first national conference of the CCP convened in 1921, the Chinese Red Army was
founded in 1927, and the CCP national government took power in 1949.
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However, as I have argued in this essay, their unwillingness to deal
with the CCP may also simply reflect their practice of labeling the
particular experience of the as a universal theoretical framework for
legal systems. This approach leads to two sorts of responses in
dealing with the issue of Party influence. One is to list examples of
the glorious history of judicial independence in foreign countries.
Either they think that they will persuade the Chinese people,
government, and Communist Party to carry out judicial reform or
even revolution on the basis of the Western model, or they hope that
they by not talking about Party influence on the judiciary, it can be
made to gradually disappear. This is not an unreasonable strategy for
pushing judicial reform, but I doubt that it can be successful and find
it naïve. It cannot be successful because the Party and government’s
influence are a historically constructed and established fact. Whether
one likes it or not, the Party is an integral component around which
the judicial system revolves. If one wants to reform the legal system,
then one has to face this situation directly.
Another common approach by some Chinese scholars is to
oppose the Party’s involvement and treat it as a historical mistake
rather than understand how the current system happened. They do
not look for or do not see the variables that constitute the cause and
effect relationship that explains China’s current system. Because they
insist on using an idealist historical point of view rather than a
materialist one from which to understand the history of the judicial
system, they cannot see that the Party was, from the outset, an
external force in the system, but one that is now fully integrated.
They persist in imagining the glorious moment in which an unsullied
legal system emerged and thereafter and forever remained innocent,
flawless, and pure. This sort of hope is very important in establishing
the courage and commitment for judicial reform, but it is of little
advantage in successfully accomplishing that reform.
Against these two approaches, I would argue that in studying
contemporary China, one must treat either the GMD or CCP as a
constituent element of the political and legal system or as a
constitutional structure. That implies that no matter how much it
deviates from “the standard” or the experience of Western countries,
the system should be seen as something normal and not as a freak or
an anomaly produced by mistaken theories and viewpoints. And
despite the current system’s weaknesses, problems, and even
mistakes, nearly all of which are in some way directly or indirectly
connected to the Party’s influence, one cannot ignore the Party’s
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positive contributions, which are often the flip-side of what is
perceived as negative.
Without question, what was reasonable and ideal yesterday does
not necessarily remain so today. Today, in the wake of China’s
reform and development, the relationship between the Party and the
judicial system certainly needs adjustment and reform. Whether the
path to reform is the 1980s approach of separating Party from state,
Jiang Zemin’s “three representatives” (sange daibiao) approach of
enlarging the party’s representativeness, or something else, they all
require careful, attentive long-term work from those involved with
the law. However, the effect of history means that we cannot start
anew. If we cannot treat seriously China’s adjudicature of yesterday,
then there is no way to understand its adjudicature of today or to
anticipate what it will be in the future. The past is one of the
variables in the current system and will certainly influence
tomorrow’s. For the sake not only of legal scholarship, but also of
legal practice, the Party’s role in the judiciary and in administration of
justice must be objectively understood and not treated as an
abstraction.
I am not making a value judgment about whether the Chinese
model of the Party as preceding and shaping government, judiciary,
and even the army is good or right. What I am suggesting is that we
revise the theoretical model for studying and understanding the
relationship between the Party and modern China and base it on the
Chinese experience. My aim is to make effective, practical, and, most
importantly, constructive suggestions for China’s social, political, and
judicial reform. Even though I am expecting to be criticized or even
condemned by people from both the left and right for what I said in
this essay—in particular for my undifferentiated treatment of the
CCP and GMD and for my depiction of the CCP as a constitutional
alternative in China’s social transformation, I welcome such criticism
because it may prove that I have done something right.

